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College Sports and the Antitrust
Analysis of Mystique
Sherman J. Clark∗
Abstract
In this response to Marc Edelman’s Article, The District
Court Decision in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association: A Small Step Forward for College-Athlete Rights,
and a Gateway for Far Grander Change, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
2319 (2014), I highlight a set of conceptual issues that must be
confronted if courts are to craft a coherent and stable body of law
governing the NCAA’s treatment of student-athletes. First, the
value of the product at issue here—college sports—is intimately
connected with the nature of the labor used to create it. Second,
the nature of that value is amorphous, contingent, and greater
than the sum of its parts. Third, the fairness arguments that drive
much of the litigation in this area are based on tenuous
assumptions about the relationship between the labor used to
create the product and the value of the product.
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I have been asked to respond to Marc Edelman’s Article1
describing and commenting on the case of O’Bannon v. NCAA.2 It
is difficult to keep on top of the details of this ongoing litigation
while retaining a sense of perspective, and Edelman is among
just a handful of scholars who have been able to do so. Although I
do not agree fully with Edelman’s conclusions—particularly
regarding the connection between antitrust and Title IX,3 the
Article is a clear, accurate, and thoughtful description of the case.
By way of response, therefore, rather than march step by step
through the ground Edelman has so ably covered, I would like to
take this opportunity to highlight a set of conceptual difficulties
underlying this and related litigation—difficulties with which I
believe that neither Edelman nor the courts have sufficiently
come to terms.
The difficulties, all interconnected, are these. First, the value
of the product at issue here—college sports—is intimately
connected with the nature of the labor used to create it. Second,
the nature of that value is amorphous, contingent, and greater
than the sum of its parts. Third, the fairness arguments that
motivate or at least inform litigation of this sort are arguably
based on tenuous assumptions about the relationship between
the labor used to create the product and the value of the product.
In this brief Essay, I do not try to resolve these issues, although I
do hope to offer some useful perspective. Rather, my aim is to
bring to the fore a set of concerns that courts and commentators
ought to acknowledge and address.
Litigating parties, given their particular litigation goals and
strategic thinking, might not be inclined to address these issues
at the necessary level of generality or with the requisite depth.
1. Marc Edelman, The District Court Decision in O’Bannon v. National
Collegiate Athletic Association: A Small Step Forward for College-Athlete
Rights, and a Gateway for Far Grander Change, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2319
(2014).
2. No. C-09-3329-CW, 2014 WL 3899815 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014).
3. Edelman has, I believe, underestimated the Title IX compliance
problems a school would generate for itself should it choose to take advantage of
the freedom to offer men’s football and basketball players a share of licensing
revenues. While an analysis of that issue is beyond the scope of this Essay, there
is no rule allowing schools to treat male athletes better than female athletes
merely because the male athletes play the sports that earn the money used to
afford the better treatment.
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But we need not second-guess the parties’ reasons for framing the
issues as they do in order to recognize that the courts can and
should look to the bigger picture. It will be difficult, if not
impossible, to develop a coherent body of law in this area unless
courts come to terms with the deeper conceptual problems
inherent in the application of antitrust law to the National
College Athletic Association’s (NCAA) treatment of studentathletes. This will not be easy. However, the challenge presented
by these cases is also an opportunity. Situations like this—in
which the law as familiarly understood does not fit easily—
facilitate, indeed force, us to rethink and deepen our familiar
understandings. If the courts can confront the conceptual
problems presented by these cases, the result may not only be a
more coherent body of law governing the antitrust status of the
NCAA, but also a deeper understanding of both antitrust law and
the unique American institution of big-time college sports.
By way of background, as Edelman describes, § 1 of the
Sherman
Act
does
not
prohibit
every
“contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade,” but bars only
unreasonable restraints of trade.4 An unreasonable, and thus
illegal, restraint is one that is anticompetitive in its net effect.5
Restraints that allow the creation of a product that would not
exist otherwise are for that reason not anticompetitive in effect,
and thus not unreasonable.6 This is true even if the restraints in
question are of a sort that in other contexts might be
anticompetitive. So, beneath the doctrinal complexity, the
essential question for the courts is this: are the restraints
imposed by the NCAA necessary to create and maintain this
product? This question, difficult and complex in any context, is
particularly problematic in the context of college sports for at
least two reasons.

4. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
5. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)
(noting that “[e]very agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade,
restrains” and that restraints are only illegal when they are so anticompetitive
as to “suppress or even destroy competition”).
6. See Thomas A. Pirano, Jr., Identifying Monopolists’ Illegal Conduct
Under the Sherman Act, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 809, 827 (2000) (“The Sherman Act
encouraged firms to compete aggressively by . . . developing new products . . . .”).
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First, the restraints that the NCAA has imposed are
restraints on the nature of the labor used to create the product.
NCAA members conspire to ensure that the product they
collectively produce—college sports—is created by a particular
form of low-cost labor—amateur student-athletes. Such restraints
would in most cases violate the Sherman Act. As a general rule,
antitrust defendants cannot justify restraints in a labor market
by pointing to procompetitive effects in a separate product
market.7 A group of manufacturing firms could not, for example,
justify cooperative wage-fixing on the theory that it helps them
make products more cheaply and thus compete more effectively
against the manufacturers of other, similar products. Indeed, key
antitrust opinions from a generation ago can be read as simply
applying this principle to sports, suggesting that labor restraints
in sports can never be justified on the grounds that they help the
league compete better against other forms of entertainment.8
Recent opinions, however, including that of the United States
Supreme Court in American Needle, Inc. v. NFL,9 have recognized
that sports are different.10 These opinions have suggested that
the anticompetitive effects of some labor restraints imposed by
professional sports leagues should be balanced against the
procompetitive effects of those restraints in a “closely related”
product market.11 This principle has not been well or coherently
worked out by the courts, so it remains unclear what sorts of
restraints might be justified by what sorts of procompetitive
effects. In part, the lack of coherence and predictability in this
area stems from the failure of courts to get to the heart of the
7. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963) (noting
the negative consequences of allowing anticompetitive effects in one market to
be justified by precompetitive consequences in another).
8. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183–89 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (rejecting claims by the National Football League that the draft—a
restraint on trade—was “procompetitive” in that it created greater parity
between teams, which in turn led to more even and entertaining games).
9. 560 U.S. 183 (2010).
10. See, e.g., Toscano v. PGA Tour, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1120–24
(E.D. Cal. 2002) (discussing antitrust issues as they related to the Senior PGA
Tour, now known as the Champions Tour).
11. See Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 203 (stating that the Court recognizes
competitive balance as a legitimate interest (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984))).
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matter. In particular, they have not made clear what sort of
connection there should be between the labor and product
markets in order to render appropriate the balancing of effects in
the two.
Properly understood, the relevant question ought not simply
be the closeness of the connection between the labor and product
markets but rather the nature of that connection. At a minimum,
a labor restraint should be considered sufficiently connected to
the product market to justify the balancing of effects if the
restraint is crucial to the creation of a product that would not
exist otherwise. Recognizing this allows us to see that the
principle that should guide this inquiry is one that applies more
broadly, and with which antitrust courts do in fact have some
experience. In the seminal case of Broadcast Music v. Columbia
Broadcasting System,12 for example, the Court recognized that an
arrangement, which on its face appeared to be price-fixing, might
yet be procompetitive because it made possible a product—
blanket licenses allowing for the performance of a wide range of
copyrighted works—that would not be possible otherwise.13 So,
the essential question is not a new one. Rather, it is a matter of
applying the principle to labor restraints. Do the restraints make
possible the product?
In the context of sports leagues, there are two sorts of ways
in which a labor restraint might be essential to the creation of the
product. First, it might be necessary or important that the labor
be distributed in a particular way—presumably with some degree
of evenness. This idea is at the heart of all the competitive
balance arguments made by cooperative sports enterprises in
support of labor restriction. These arguments are tenuous,
however, and often fail to justify restraints. It can appear that
the organization making the argument has confused or conflated
increased competition on the field with the increased economic
competition that must be shown in order to justify an otherwise
anticompetitive restraint. Thus, it can appear as though the
enterprise is simply arguing that the restraints allow it to make

12. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
13. See id. at 24 (ruling that this case was not an instance of price fixing
because the blanket license did not mask anything).
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better products—an argument that is of course foreclosed by
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States.14
The NCAA falls into this trap whenever it makes arguments
about competitive balance and the like. Such arguments not only
fail to justify the restraints in question, but they fail to highlight
the crucial difference between college and professional sports,
and thus obscure the underlying issues that most need to be
illuminated.
In the context of college sports, the nature of the relationship
between the labor and product is qualitatively different because
the nature of the labor used to create the product is arguably
essential to the nature and value of the product in a way not
found in other contexts, including most professional sports. It is
not simply the case that allowing defendants to collude in a labor
market will allow them to produce better products. Rather, this is
a situation—rare if not unique—in which the restrained nature of
the labor market is the product. They are selling not just football
and basketball games, but football and basketball games played
by a certain sort of player.
A partial analogy might be to a firm selling furniture made
by Amish craftsmen, marketing to people who admire and want
to support the Amish lifestyle and who cherish the thought of
sitting on furniture made by the people they so admire. Such a
firm could certainly decide to employ or contract with only Amish
furniture makers. The analogy is only partial, however, because
such a firm could simply unilaterally decide to hire or contract
with Amish craftsmen. The analogy fails to capture the necessity
for cooperation which is at the heart of the difficulty in the
context of college sports. There are few, if any, contexts other
than college sports in which the nature of the labor is somehow
inherent in the value of the product and where that particular
form of labor, and thus that product, can be secured only through
cooperation.
The precedent most closely on point might be a 2002 case
involving the senior golf tour, Toscano v. PGA Tour, Inc.15 There,
14. 435 U.S. 679, 693–95 (1978) (enjoining a restraint designed to protect
against subpar engineering because of “the legislative judgment that ultimately
competition will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and
services”).
15. 201 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
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the tour members agreed among themselves to manage entry into
tournaments in ways that favored famous over-50 golfers, and
thus limited the participation of some more skilled but less wellknown golfers.16 The basic logic of the case was that the product
offered by the senior tour was not just golf tournaments, or even
golf tournaments for older players. Rather, the tour was to a
large extent an old-timers event, appealing to fans’ memories of
their favorite players’ former exploits.17 It was thus permissible to
limit entry to players with former exploits for fans to remember.18
The court held that the restraints were not anticompetitive
in economic effect, and opined: “Even if Toscano had provided
evidence of significant anticompetitive effects, the defendants
have amply demonstrated that the eligibility rules have a series
of procompetitive justifications. The eligibility rules provide a
product that otherwise would not exist and, therefore, they
further consumer welfare.”19 Labor could be restrained because it
was the nature of the labor that made the product what it was.20
Framing the issue in this way makes clear that in the context
of college sports some restraints on labor must be necessary. If we
want this product—games played by a certain sort of player—to
exist, those producing it must be able to require that the games
be played by that sort of player. And if cooperation is necessary to
that end, then they must be permitted to cooperate. This does
not, however, answer the more difficult question. Which
restraints are truly necessary? What exactly makes a player the
sort of player that people are willing to pay to see play?
This highlights the second and more fundamental difficulty
inherent in these cases. The nature of the product—its value, its
appeal, and its connection to the labor used to create it—is
amorphous and difficult to pin down. That, in turn, makes it very

16. Id. at 1112.
17. See id. at 1113 (“The Tour provides an entertainment product in which
primarily well known and popular senior golfers may compete against one
another.”).
18. See id. at 1126 (explaining that the restrictions on tournament entry
were not unreasonable).
19. Id. at 1123.
20. See id. at 1126 (explaining that restraining the type of player to enter
this tournament was acceptable because it was a part of the business model).
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difficult to determine which of its features are essential to its
creation and ongoing value.
What makes college sports valuable and appealing? At one
level, college football and basketball are merely lower-level
versions of games that are played at a much higher level by
professional athletes. But if that were all they were, they would
not be so popular and they would not be worth much money.
Consider how few people watch NBA Development League
games, which are played at a similar (if not higher) level than are
college basketball games.21 Or think about how few people are
interested in lower-level football leagues, which rarely last more
than a few years, and which never make money.22
So, why do millions of people watch college football and
basketball? What is it that makes this product so much more
appealing than seemingly similar, semi-professional sports? No
one knows for sure. It is clearly some combination of tradition,
amateurism, mythology, community spirit, nostalgia, idealism,
and other intangible qualities. It would not be too much to
describe it as a mystique.
Antitrust courts do not have much experience with the
analysis of mystique. They have proven unwilling to wrestle with
the question of how the various facets of college sports come
together to produce the product capable of generating such
revenue. Instead, courts tend to assess restraints serially, as they
are challenged, in a way that makes it difficult to assess what the
essential components are—and hard for the NCAA ever to prove
21. Compare NBA D-League Achieves Record-Breaking Growth During
2013-14
Season,
NBA.COM
(May
1,
2013),
http://www.nba.com/dleague/news/nba_development_league_record_breaking_gr
owth_2014_05_01.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2014) (stating that the total
attendance for all teams in the 2013–14 NBA D-League season was 1,181,404)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review), with 2014 NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, 2014 NCAA MEN’S BASKETBALL ATTENDANCE
(2014), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/stats/m_basketball_RB/Reports/attend/2014.pdf
(providing that the University of North Carolina alone had a home basketball
attendance of 324,458 in the 2013–14 season).
22. See, e.g., Steve Johnson, Tuesday-Morning Quarterbacking the Demise
of the XFL, CHI. TRIB. (May 15, 2001), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/200105-15/features/0105140260_1_vince-mcmahon-xfl-rival-networks (last visited
Dec. 1, 2014) (discussing the failure of the XFL, a professional football league
designed to emphasize entertainment) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
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that any particular change will be the straw that breaks the
camel’s back.
The process began three decades ago in NCAA v. Board of
Regents of the University of Oklahoma & University of Georgia
Athletic Association;23 but only Justice White, dissenting in that
case, seemed to see the slippery slope for what it was.24 The case
involved a set of agreements to limit television broadcasts of
college football games; when taken together, those agreements
limited output and fixed the prices of television broadcast of
games.25 The court recognized this and rejected the NCAA’s
efforts to argue that the agreements were in various ways
procompetitive.26 Justice White, in dissent, disagreed with the
court’s analysis on several particular points, but his key concern
seemed to be less about the reasoning in the case than about the
consequences of the ruling.27
The majority in Board of Regents seemed to assume that the
ruling would leave untouched the ability of NCAA members
legally to agree on such things as eligibility and amateurism
requirements, which the court saw as necessary to preserve the
nature of the product: “In order to preserve the character and
quality of the ‘product,’ athletes must not be paid, must be
required to attend class, and the like. And the integrity of the
‘product’ cannot be preserved except by mutual agreement.”28 But
Justice White realized that once antitrust scrutiny was applied to
the NCAA, even as to something so seemingly far removed from
the NCAA’s central mission as TV contracts, subsequent
23. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
24. See id. at 135–36 (White, J., dissenting) (“The collateral consequences
of the spreading of regional and national appearances among a number of
schools are many.”).
25. See id. at 94 (majority opinion) (explaining that “[n]o member is
permitted to make any sale of television rights except in accordance with the
basic plan”).
26. See id. at 120 (“[C]onsistent with the Sherman Act, the role of the
NCAA must be to preserve a tradition that might otherwise die; rules that
restrict output are hardly consistent with this role.”).
27. See id. at 128 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that “unlimited
appearances by a few schools would inevitably give them an insuperable
advantage over all others and in the end defeat any efforts to maintain a system
of athletic competition among amateurs who measure up to college scholastic
requirements”).
28. Id. at 102 (majority opinion).
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challenges would call into question aspects of NCAA regulation
more central to the continued survival of college sports.29
The Seventh Circuit attempted to forestall this consequence
in Banks v. NCAA,30 a case challenging an NCAA rule prohibiting
players from hiring agents.31 The court recognized that if that
particular student-athlete eligibility requirement were made
subject to antitrust scrutiny, it would be difficult or impossible to
make principled determinations about which requirements are
truly necessary to maintain the “character and quality” of college
sports.32 So the court simply asserted, without much analysis,
that there was no anticompetitive impact on any labor market,
that NCAA members were “purchasers of labor” in their
relationships with student-athletes, and that there was therefore
no antitrust violation.33 But judicial fiat was not sufficient to stop
a slide down a slope this slippery.
The next step was Law v. NCAA,34 in which the Tenth
Circuit held that the NCAA was subject to antitrust scrutiny not
only when its members were acting as sellers of a product but
also as employers—in that case employers of coaches.35
Accordingly, anticompetitive restraints in that labor market also
violated the Sherman Act.36 Still, the court seemed to assume, as
did the NCAA, that this would not implicate student-athlete
eligibility requirements.37 Again, there was no warrant for that
29. See id. at 134 (White, J., dissenting) (“The legitimate noneconomic
goals of colleges and universities should not be ignored in analyzing restraints
imposed by associations of such institutions on their members.”).
30. 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992).
31. See id. at 1083 (describing a situation in which a player was denied
reinstatement by the NCAA after entering the NFL draft).
32. Id. at 1089 (citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984)).
33. Id. at 1095.
34. 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).
35. See id. at 1023 (describing the NCAA as failing to meet its burden of
showing that “the procompetitive justifications for a restraint on trade outweigh
its anticompetitive effects”).
36. See id. at 1016 (“To prevail on a section 1 claim under the Sherman Act,
the coaches needed to prove that the NCAA (1) participated in an agreement
that (2) unreasonably restrained trade in the relevant market.”).
37. See id. at 1021 (“In Board of Regents the Supreme Court recognized
that certain horizontal restraints, such as the conditions of the contest and the
eligibility of participants, are justifiable under the antitrust laws because they
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assumption. Once the NCAA was subject to antitrust scrutiny as
an employer, it was inevitable that student-athlete eligibility
requirements would be called into question. And they were.
So here we are. The District Court in O’Bannon has held that
there is no evidence that payments to college athletes of less than
$20,000 would harm consumer demand for college sports.38 That
is probably right. But if so, why not payments of $30,000? Or
$50,000? Any line will be inherently arbitrary and unstable.
Nor is it hard to predict the next step—an antitrust
challenge to academic-eligibility requirements. The O’Bannon
court seems to assume that its ruling does not implicate NCAA
rules requiring athletes to be full-time students; and on its face it
does not. But the logic is inexorable. Is it truly essential to the
character of college sports that players be full-time students?
Would it really destroy the product if schools were permitted to
allow part-time students to participate? Indeed, why require
schools to require that players be students at all? It may seem
obvious that academic-eligibility requirements are different—
that, of course, schools must be permitted to agree on such
matters. But to make that assumption would be to show the same
lack of foresight and imagination evinced by the Supreme Court
in Board of Regents and by the Tenth Circuit in Law.
Of course, courts could simply draw a line by fiat—declare
that academic-eligibility requirements are not illegal; but again,
the line will be arbitrary and the cases unpredictable. The
essential problem is that it will be difficult or impossible for the
NCAA to show that any one particular thing about who plays
college sports is by itself essential. It is very hard to define the
essential components of a mystique, and it will be impossible to
do so as long as the components are addressed one by one as they
arise in isolated cases challenged in litigation. Instead, if there is
to be a coherent and stable body of law in this area, it will require
that courts and commentators, aided perhaps by thoughtful
economists and social scientists, look to the big picture and help
are necessary to create the product of competitive college sports.”).
38. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. C-09-3329-CW,
2014 WL 3899815, at *28 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014) (“[T]he Court does not find
these findings to be credible evidence that consumer demand for the NCAA’s
product would decrease if student-athletes were permitted to receive
compensations.”).
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us figure this out. And, if it turns out that it is simply not
possible for antitrust courts to figure out or articulate coherently
which components of college sports are essential to preserving its
value, and we nonetheless want that value preserved, we should
consider a statutory exemption that would shield some portion of
the enterprise from antitrust scrutiny.
Recognizing the amorphous nature of this product also sheds
light on the fairness and exploitation arguments that accompany,
if not motivate, much of this litigation. It is seen as unfair for
colleges to make so much money when it is in some sense the
players who are bringing in the money. But are they? Recall that
what the players do—play lower-level versions of professional
sports—would not be, and in fact is not, of interest or value
outside of the unique context of college sports. The product—the
thing that commands attention and thus generates the revenue—
is in fact the amorphous mystique described above, which is
generated and maintained by a larger set of institutions and
traditions and practices of which any given player is just one
inessential part. As to most players, to say that he deserves a cut
because he brings in the money is analogous to saying that the
driver of an armored car bringing deposits to a bank deserves a
cut because he is the one bringing in the money.
Individual players seem to be, and feel that they are,
particularly valuable because so much effort is spent on
recruiting them. No one competes for armored car drivers. But
here is what gets missed. The value of particular players, even
most particularly talented players, is distributional rather than
value producing. The allocation of talent impacts who wins more
games, and, thus, which schools get a larger share of the revenue
produced by the collective enterprise—through bowl game
appearances, tournament bonuses, larger shares of broadcasting
revenue, and the like. But the overall appeal and value of college
sports does not depend on who wins games or on how the overall
revenue is distributed among schools. Indeed, if there is any
merit to the competitive-balance arguments made by the NCAA,
particularly talented players may actually undercut the value of
the enterprise.
Consider, by way of analogy, if NASCAR were to allow race
teams to use different tires, and if the best tires were in short
supply. Teams would spend tremendous money and energy
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choosing and competing for better tires because slightly better
tires can mean the difference in any given race. But it would be a
mistake to conclude that having the best possible tires is crucial
to the popularity and appeal of the collective endeavor. It is not.
Indeed, NASCAR recognizes this and standardizes tires,
discouraging collective expenditure on aspects of the sport with
merely distributional rather than value-enhancing effects.39
Because the appeal of college sports is based not on the absolute
level of play, but on the mix of mystique and tradition described
above, most players are like tires. Their particular talents may be
distributionally important—thus, the effort spent recruiting
them; but as to the overall value of the sport, they just need to be
good enough and relatively evenly distributed.
I say “most players” because there are certainly rare and
special players whose particular talents or personalities
contribute to the overall appeal of, and, thus, the revenue
generated by, college sports as a whole. The “Fab Five” at
Michigan were an example—as, more recently, was “Johnny
Football” at Texas A&M. Fairness suggests that such players
share in the revenue that they as individuals help generate—or
at least that they should be permitted to earn income in ways
that do not undercut the viability of the larger endeavor through
which they have that very earning capacity.
It would be difficult or impossible to determine which players
have this individual impact on the appeal of college sports, and to
what extent. However, simply recognizing the difficulty and
significance of this question is important in evaluating the
fairness arguments underpinning much of this litigation. The
recognition suggests a potential, if partial, solution to the linedrawing problems faced by the courts: allow players to do paid
third-party endorsements. Given a case providing the appropriate
platform, the courts could rule that it is unnecessarily
anticompetitive, and thus illegal, for the NCAA to collude to

39. I do not mean to suggest that the tire-restriction cases are on point as a
matter of substantive antitrust law. Unlike the situation with student-athletes,
there is no sense in which the particular nature of the tires is essential to the
overall value of the sport. Thus, the legality of race-car tire restrictions hinges
essentially on competitive-balance arguments, which arguments, as noted, are
not at the heart of the NCAA’s best defense.
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preclude member schools from allowing players to make
commercials or sign memorabilia.
The district court in O’Bannon seems to have rejected this
option, opining that “[a]llowing student-athletes to endorse
commercial products would undermine the efforts of both the
NCAA and its member schools to protect against the ‘commercial
exploitation’ of student-athletes.”40 As Edelman notes, however,
the court seems to have had little or no basis for this assertion.41
In fact, it is not at all clear that allowing student-athletes to do
endorsements would cause undue difficulties. Moreover, such a
ruling would provide a less arbitrary line. Schools would not be
paying players at all, so courts would not be faced with the
slippery slope of how much is too much.
Note also that the plaintiffs in O’Bannon did not seek such a
remedy.42 And why not? Because there would be very little money
to be made by most players through third-party endorsements.
And why is that? Because most players are not, as individuals,
the source of much of the interest generated by sports. What the
plaintiffs would no doubt describe as the inadequacy of the
remedy is itself evidence that the fairness logic underlying their
claims is less strong than we might be inclined to believe.
This would, as I say, be just a partial solution because at
least some high-profile players no doubt contribute to the overall
appeal of not only their sport, but also their NCAA member
schools. In addition to being permitted to do endorsements, the
Fab Five or Johnny Football might with some justice claim to
have been entitled to a share of the marketing and licensing
revenue generated by Michigan, by Texas A&M, and by the
NCAA as a whole—at least to the extent that that revenue had
been augmented by the particular popularity of those players.

40. O’Bannon, 2014 WL 3899815, at *47.
41. See Edelman, supra note 1, at 2336 (noting that “much evidence at trial
indicated that the NCAA itself does not always act in a manner to protect such
exploitation”).
42. See O’Bannon, 2014 WL 3899815, at *1 (explaining that the plaintiffs
only sought the right to receive “a share of the revenue that the NCAA and its
member schools earn from the sale of licenses to use the student-athletes’
names, images, and likeness in videogames, live game telecasts, and other
footage”).

COLLEGE SPORTS AND MYSTIQUE

229

Still, although not a complete solution, allowing players to do
endorsements would at least do three things. It would solve some
of the fairness and exploitation problems. It would clarify the
(limited) extent to which most players are in fact bringing in the
money so as to deserve a cut. And it would provide a (relatively)
stable stopping point on the slippery slope from Board of Regents
to the end of big-time college sports.43

43. In addition, it would not violate Title IX for schools simply to allow all
players—male and female—to engage in a reasonable amount of third-party
endorsements.

